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n a review of the literature on comparative politics, 
provocatively entitled  "Paradigms and Sand Cas- 
...tles,"  Barbara Geddes  (1991)  bemoans  the  tran- 
sient nature of the field. Rather than being rejected, 
theories  are  being  discarded,  she  declares;  as  new 
phenomena  capture  our  attention,  so  do  new  ap- 
proaches to the study of politics. The field thus appears 
to be driven by fads. Geddes concludes her unflattering 
portrayal by pointing to a series of new entrants into 
the  study  of  comparative politics,  including  rational 
choice theory. 
As evidenced by the books under review, in the short 
time  since  the  Geddes  essay, the  rational choice  ap- 
proach has indeed infiltrated the field. Consistent with 
the tendies  that Geddes  described and decried, com- 
pelling  political  events  provide  the  impetus  for  its 
invasion: the fall of communism, the rise of democracy, 
and the  resurgence  of  ethnic  conflict. The  questions 
this reviewer therefore confronts are: Do  these books 
constitute  evidence  of  further faddism?  Or  do  they 
represent efforts to  contribute to the cumulative cre- 
ation of knowledge? And what are the strengths and 
Note:  The  author wishes  to  thank David  Laitin,  Mark Lichbach, 
Susan Stokes, Barry Weingast, and two anonymous referees for their 
comments and criticisms. The faults that remain are his alone. 
weaknesses of rational choice approaches to the study 
of politics, as exemplified in these volumes? 
THE BOOKS 
In addressing such questions, I begin with Breton et al., 
Nationalism and Rationality.  I then turn to works on the 
fall of communism, then to studies of the rise, fall, and 
practice of democracy. I conclude with a critique and 
evaluation. 
Ethnicity 
For individuals, the costs of violence  often  appear to 
outweigh  the  benefits;  and,  for  society  as  a  whole, 
violence,  though  costly,  merely  redistributes  rather 
than creates resources. Violence  is therefore destruc- 
tive, and ethnic violence particularly so. For these and 
other reasons, ethnic conflict poses fundamental chal- 
lenges  to  any theory based on the premise of ration- 
ality.  Thus,  the  recent  reassertion  of  ethnic  claims 
stands  as  a  challenge  to  the  recent  rise  of  rational 
choice  theory in the comparative study of politics (as 
was recognized by Weiner and Huntington 1987). 
In earlier works, Breton (1964) and Gellner (1979) 
deployed the tools of political economy, as they under- 
stood  them, to  address the phenomenon  of ethnicity. 
Nationalism and Rationality celebrates their contribu- 
tions  and  provides  new  ones.  As  the  arguments  of 
Breton and Gellner have since long been absorbed by 
other  scholars, I concentrate  on the contributions by 
others. 
One is by Russell Hardin (whose own recent book, 
One for All,  1995, fully warrants independent review). 
Arguing against so-called primordialist theories, Har- 
din agrees that ethnic groups promote socially irration- 
al behavior; but, he insists, ethnic identification is the 
result of individually rational decisions. Within ethnic 
boundaries, individuals find it beneficial to cooperate, 
that is, to take actions beneficial for the group, since 
they expect other members to engage in such behavior. 
But this logic may not apply across groups. The gains of 
one  group may come  at the expense  of  another, and 
what members of  one  group may regard as coopera- 
tion, members of another may experience as predation. 
The boundary of group membership may form a locus 
of  conflict, and in the  midst of  antagonism, expecta- 
tions of hostility may become  self-confirming. Hardin 
thus views  ethnic  identification  as a result of  choice 
making in  environments  in which  expectations  need 
not be revised. "The group may [then become] instru- 
mentally good  for its members, who  may tend ...  to 
think it is inherently, not merely contingently, good," 
he argues (p. 41), while nonmembers may come to view 
the group, and its loyalists, as arrogant, privileged, and 
threatening. Beliefs  about good  and evil, cooperation 
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and defection, become  rational beliefs. Ethnic coordi- 
nation therefore leads not only to inclusion but also to 
exclusion and conflict. 
Wintrobe's  paper  also  deserves  a  wide  audience. 
Building an ethnic community, Wintrobe stresses, re- 
quires investments  in  human capital. Property rights 
are costly to create and enforce; by investing resources 
in  relationships, people,  in  effect,  render themselves 
vulnerable, thereby offering assurances that they will 
honor their commitments to  others. An  ethnic group 
contains  a dense  set  of  such relationships; defection 
from  its  ranks would  trigger  costly  responses;  and 
membership therefore provides the underpinnings for 
trust and honorable behavior. The result is that it often 
becomes  easier  to  transact within rather than across 
ethnic groups. Their subjective properties as commu- 
nities  thus  become  objectively valuable.  And  this  is 
particularly the case when other means for enforcing 
contracts, such as the state, weaken or disintegrate, as 
has  taken  place  in  Africa,  Eastern  Europe,  and the 
former Soviet Union. 
In his essay, Coleman interprets membership as an 
entitlement: Ethnic groups, like nations, allocate rights, 
he argues, and people  seeking to defend their entitle- 
ments  make  private sacrifices for  the  collectivity. In 
another  essay,  Congleton  applies club  theory  to  the 
study of ethnic groups. Taken together, the papers in 
this volume  provide a series of  analytically motivated 
insights into the rational foundations for the formation 
of ethnic groups and for the contemporary resurgence 
of ethnic nationalism. 
The Fall of Communism 
As  revealed  in earlier works (e.g.,  Weiner  and Hun- 
tington 1987), the rise of ethnic nationalism provoked 
a reaffirmation of the power of cultural approaches to 
politics.  Applying  rational  choice  techniques  to  this 
phenomenon,  Hardin,  Wintrobe,  and  others  contest 
ground already occupied  by others. No  received wis- 
dom dominates the interpretation of the fall of com- 
munism, however. In Origins of  Spontaneous Revolu- 
tion, a very able group of  scholars ventures into  this 
open  terrain; deploying standard social science  meth- 
ods,  they  explore  the  role  of  citizen  activists in  the 
overthrow  of  the  government  of  East  Germany.  In 
Private Truths  and Public Lies, Timur Kuran, an adven- 
turous theorist, joins them. The first ponder, and the 
second  uses,  forms  of  rational  choice  theory  while 
exploring the collapse of communism. 
Origins of  Spontaneous Revolution represents  a lu- 
cidly conceived  and presented  examination of  citizen 
participation  in  the  "Monday Demonstrations"  that 
precipitated the collapse  of  Communist Germany. In 
methods  and  purpose,  the  book  resembles  Inkele's 
(1961)  study of  public  opinion  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
While  inspired by the  classics -in political  sociology, 
Origins  addresses key issues in rational choice. It seeks 
to  explain why citizens participated in acts that were 
costly, potentially ineffective, and subject to free riding. 
Origins rejects  the sufficiency  of structuralist  expla- 
nations. The authors adduce persuasive  counters to 
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arguments based upon external constraints, such as the 
power of the USSR, or domestic structures, such as the 
power of the church or the weakness of the Communist 
Party. Drawing upon  1,200 interviews with randomly 
selected subjects and 200 purposefully selected respon- 
dents, the authors instead stress the central significance 
of individual choice.  The revolution, they argue, rep- 
resented  the cumulative effect of individual decisions 
to embrace the risks of public opposition to an incum- 
bent regime. 
Although  endorsing  methodological  individualism, 
and therefore breaking with a central element  of the 
sociological tradition, the authors remain unwilling to 
subscribe  to  an  instrumentalist  perspective.  They 
stress, for example, that people who faced greater risks 
of sanctions nonetheless  participated more frequently 
in  demonstrations.  More  telling  is  their  evidence 
against free riding: Endorsing a norm of political unity 
and the belief that each individual's behavior can make 
a difference, the participants were impelled to revolu- 
tionary acts, they find, by a sense of moral obligation. 
Persuaded by the evidence that while people acted as 
individuals, they were normatively driven, the authors 
flirt with  a  notion  of  "thick" rationality  (Ferejohn 
1991),  in  which  the  participants  behave  rationally, 
given their normative commitments. Alternatively, they 
appear to reason in terms of "meta-norms" (Axelrod 
1986, Taylor 1987), by which it becomes rational to act, 
knowing that others subscribe to a norm of sanctioning 
failures to do so. When the authors explore the strate- 
gic setting within which the revolution transpires, they 
slip farther into the logic of rational choice. As their 
analysis  makes  clear,  the  strategic  setting  did  not 
necessarily define a prisoners' dilemma; rather, it de- 
fined a coordination game. The more others took part, 
the stronger were the incentives for additional individ- 
uals to join. The implication is clear: Failure to respond 
to incentives to free ride is perfectly reasonable when 
such incentives do not exist. 
While addressing the same events as Origins, Kuran 
unabashedly marshals the methods of rational choice. 
Despite  its subtitle, the force of Private Truths,  Public 
Lies  does  not  derive from  the  analysis of  individual 
preferences;  it  derives,  rather, from  the  analysis of 
information. When dissidents remain uncertain of the 
true preferences of others, Kuran argues, they may well 
dissimulate regarding their own; they may behave as if 
they support the incumbent regime. When they learn 
that others also are disaffected, however, they may then 
judge it safe to act in accord with their true, underlying 
preferences and to turn against the government. 
If Origins of  Spontaneous Revolution calls to  mind 
Inkele's The Soviet Citizen (1961), Kuran's book recalls 
Schelling's Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978). It 
is relentlessly creative; playful, but with a seriousness of 
purpose; and boldly devoid of the rigorous positivism 
that informs the more sociologically minded study of 
Origins. 
The  information  cascades  so  lucidly  exposed  by 
Kuran provide a mechanism  that generates  the  pro- 
cesses described  and probed in Origins.  In doing so, 
they account for the way in which public demonstra- 
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tions can build, even in the absence of explicit organi- 
zation, and thereby result in powerful waves of collec- 
tive  dissent.  In  addition,  they  offer  insight  into  the 
circumstances in which such demonstrations fail. The 
initial starting point can be such that the dynamics will 
dampen,  rather  than  build;  or  the  distribution  of 
preferences may be such that only demonstrations of 
an  improbably great  magnitude  will  trigger  further 
conversions. Kuran's model thus not only accounts for 
revolutions that occur but also those that do not. While 
covering the  empirical analysis of  Origins, it also  ac- 
counts for other observations: specifically, for revolu- 
tions that fail. 
Indeed, Kuran's major objective is to explain politi- 
cal  arrangements that,  while  manifestly  illegitimate, 
nonetheless  remain  intact.  He  analyzes  Stalinist  re- 
gimes in Europe and political correctness in the United 
States. He addresses, in addition, racial discrimination, 
affirmative  action, McCarthyism, and the caste system. 
Sure to offend, his work also informs. It informs us not 
only about the subjects that he addresses but also about 
ways in which to think about them. A model, he shows, 
provides an abstract account; erasing "proper names" 
it highlights the logic of explanation. It therefore can 
be  applied  not  only  to  the  data  from  which  it  was 
derived but also against "out of sample" cases. And, 
indeed,  it is the latter in which it is truly tested.  (See 
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Bates et al., n.d.). 
Democracy:  Its  Rise  and  Demise 
Ethnic nationalism and the fall of communism animate 
much of the politics of our time. As Geddes forecast, 
and we have witnessed, they also animate much of our 
scholarship. Accompanying these forces is a third: the 
rise of  democracy. As  evidenced  by the work of  Co- 
lomer and Cohen, it also has attracted the interests of 
scholars committed to the use of rational choice theory. 
Colomer's Game Theory and the Transition focuses 
on  the  transition to  democracy in Spain, one  of  the 
seminal events, according to Huntington (1991), in the 
third  wave  of  democratization.  While  the  work  of 
Origins  brings to mind the classics in political sociology, 
that of Kuran and the writings of Schelling (1978), it is 
the work of  Riker (e.g.,  1982) with which Colomer's 
book most strongly resonates. As did Riker, Colomer 
focuses  on  discrete  episodes  to  explore  the  way  in 
which political  leaders picked  their way through un- 
promising political terrains. Like Riker, he  reveals a 
keen sense of paradox.  Extreme outcomes, he illustrates, 
were avoided, even though preferred by large numbers; 
for the political agenda  was crafted  by sophisticated  elites, 
who maneuvered to secure moderate outcomes. 
In Origins,  Karl-Dieter Opp and associates start with 
a case and search for a general framework; they lodge, 
albeit uncomfortably, in the realm of "thick"  rationality 
and coordination games. Kuran starts with a general 
framework and searches for  additional applications.1 
Colomer,  for  his  part,  addresses  a  single  case  and 
1 Both Opp et al. and Kuran could have greatly benefited from the 
important contribution of Lohmann (1994). 
employs but a single framework, based on the analysis 
of majority rule in a single-dimension issue space with 
complete  information. The strength of Colomer's ap- 
proach is that it yields  a sense  of  the  significance of 
microlevel details. We see the players clearly, grasp the 
tactics they employ, and, like them, emerge surprised 
by  the  outcomes  resulting  from  their  choices.  Co- 
lomer's  approach  also  reveals  how  macroevents  are 
generated-often  in  ways  that  have  not  been  fore- 
seen-by  small, discrete decisions. 
While  Colomer  focuses  on  the  rise  of  democracy, 
Cohen focuses  on its collapse. Drawing on studies of 
Brazil  in  the  1960s  and  Chile  in  the  1970s,  Cohen 
argues that moderate leaders in Latin America became 
trapped by tactical advantages that accrued to political 
militants. Political preferences  and the strategic envi- 
ronment were  such that moderates found themselves 
locked  into positions  that were  collectively  irrational 
but not  alterable  (i.e.,  that were  in equilibrium). So 
great were the pressures emanating from the radicals 
that moderates would surely have faced betrayal had 
they sought an alliance with conciliatory counterparts 
in the opposition. Lacking the ability to enforce cross- 
party alliances, then, the political leadership refrained 
from  moderate  settlements.  The  result was  an  out- 
come-the  rise of extremists and the collapse of dem- 
ocratic regimes-that  they did not choose. 
Cohen offers a positive theory of democratic break- 
down;  he  also  offers  a  critique  of  alternative  ap- 
proaches. Joining Elster (1989) and Przeworski (1985), 
Cohen criticizes political economic theories for failing 
to  specify the causal mechanism that links economic 
crisis to political outcome; without such a mechanism, 
economic  theories of politics remain functionalist, he 
argues. So, too,  do noneconomic  theories  of politics, 
based upon reified actors, like the state (e.g., Skocpol 
1979). Where, as in the case of O'Donnell (1973), such 
mechanisms are specified, Cohen calls for explanations 
based not on classes or sectors but on the actions of 
politicians. Joining Kaufman and others (Collier 1979), 
Cohen  calls for putting the politician, or at least  the 
party system, back in. To explain macroevents, such as 
the fall of democracy, he argues, the analyst must focus 
on  micropolitics:  the  choices  of  politicians  and  the 
strategic dilemmas they face in democratic settings. 
THE OPERATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 
Rational  choice  theory enters the study of politics in 
several forms. One is Madisonian. As developed at the 
University of Rochester, it applies the tools of rational 
choice  to  the study of  the self-interested  behavior of 
politicians who seek to fulfill their ambitions for office 
in the context of democratic institutions. Perhaps the 
most mature of the several traditions of rational choice 
analysis, the Madisonian tradition is represented here 
by two books. The first is Structure  and Policy, edited by 
Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins; the second is 
Making and Breaking Governments, by Michael Laver 
and Kenneth Shepsle. 
Structure  and Policy explores the relationship  be- 
tween political  institutions  and policy  outcomes  during 
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the  era  of  the  Liberal  Democratic  Party (LDP)  in 
Japan. The book focuses  upon the incentives created 
for legislative incumbents by the rules under which they 
strove for reelection.  On the one  hand stood Japan's 
parliamentary  system; on the other was, the system of 
multimember districts and nontransferable votes. Poli- 
cymaking in Japan, the  contributors argue, reflected 
the mixture of  motives  created  by these  two institu- 
tions. 
The institutions produced  a tension  between  party 
leaders and legislators  in  the  Diet.  The  two  groups 
possessed a common interest in securing majorities for 
their party at the polls; but they also possessed interests 
that conflicted over the allocation of these majorities. 
For a legislator,  the  larger the  vote  from  the  party 
faithful, the greater was the  likelihood  of  reelection; 
for the party leaders, the narrower the majorities for 
each of the candidates, the greater were the number of 
seats controlled in the Diet. The result of this mixture 
of motives, the contributors argue, was a characteristic 
pattern of policymaking: Those policies were preferred 
that  enabled  the  party  leaders  to  build  disciplined 
political blocs of delegates  in the legislature. 
As  behooves  a  mature  tradition  of  research,  the 
analysis rests on a formal model (Cox 1990). Building 
from a theoretical result, Cox, McCubbins, and Rosen- 
bluth document the  effect of  electoral  rules on  elec- 
toral strategies  and  party  organization.  A  series  of 
empirical studies then follows, focusing on budgetary 
expenditures (by McCubbins and Noble) and industrial 
regulation (by Noll,  Cohen,  Rosenbluth,  and McCub- 
bins). Chapters on foreign policy by Cowhey, Fuki, and 
Weatherford sustain the  point: Public policy is fash- 
ioned in ways that reflect  the  efforts of  the  political 
class to manage the tensions within the political orga- 
nization that keeps them in power. 
The progression from problem to model to empirical 
test marks as well the trajectory of Laver and Shepsle's 
Making  and Breaking Governments.  The problem is that 
of coalition governments: Laver and Shepsle  seek  to 
uncover the logic that underlies the stability and com- 
position  of  cabinets  in  the  postwar  democracies  of 
Western Europe. The model represents an adaptation 
of  the winset  technology  crafted  for  the  analysis of 
legislative politics in the United  States. In parliamen- 
tary settings,  political  parties  rather than  individual 
politicians constitute the basic units of analysis, Laver 
and Shepsle contend.  They therefore  adapt the  con- 
ventional specifications of spatial theory, recasting the 
issue space as a lattice rather than a continuum. Within 
this  new  representation,  Laver  and  Shepsle  show, 
winsets that in conventional specifications may contain 
majority-preferred governments  instead  stand empty; 
thus the stability of coalition governments. Moreover, 
within given configurations of preferences, certain par- 
ties become "strong":  They reside in the set of cabinets 
that can  overturn the  incumbent  regime.  As  strong 
parties can make-  or break-governments,  politicians 
seeking to  form  governments  encounter  compelling 
reasons to give them  key portfolios.  The  model  thus 
offers  a theory  of the composition  of coalition  govern- 
ments  as  well. Layer  and Shepsle  analyze  an impressive 
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array of data from postwar governments to test prop- 
ositions  derived from their model.  They characterize 
the results as "gratifying";  I would characterize them as 
impressive. 
ANALYSIS 
As argued by Geddes  (1991), we should hope  to find 
new  contributions  being  inspired  by  intellectual  de- 
bates rather than being triggered by political events. It 
is significant, therefore, that while addressing contem- 
porary political phenomena,  these works also address 
enduring issues  in  the  discipline.  They  represent  at- 
tempts  to  correct past  errors and to  achieve  deeper 
understandings. Their authors are not contributors to 
fashion but rather to scholarship. 
Hardin, for  example,  self-consciously  positions  his 
work within a broader research program: He uses the 
study  of  ethnicity  to  debate  cultural  approaches  to 
politics.  Colomer  shares Hardin's dissatisfaction with 
preference-based  explanations  and  provides  perhaps 
the most persuasive rejoinder: Given identical prefer- 
ence  configurations,  he  demonstrates,  different  out- 
comes are possible. For this (and other) reasons, then, 
collective choices cannot be explained on the basis of 
values. Behaving rationally, people  will often  end up 
choosing in ways that are not implied by their prefer- 
ences.  Cultural explanations-and  all others  that ap- 
peal to the sufficiency of values-are  therefore unsat- 
isfactory,  these  authors  contend.  They  must  be 
supplemented  with  accounts  of  the  procedures  by 
which individual choices aggregate into collective out- 
comes. 
Other authors see rational choice theory as a correc- 
tive  to  "statist" approaches  to  the  study of  politics: 
They endorse a more decentralized model of politics. 
This position  is best  illustrated, perhaps, by Cowhey 
and McCubbins in their analysis of Japan. They pro- 
vide both a forceful and subtle rejoinder to those who 
see  policy as issuing from the farsighted vision  of  an 
elite bureaucracy. Their target is, of course, the statist 
interpretation that has thus far provided the dominant 
model of Japanese politics. 
The critique of structuralism by Karl-Dieter Opp et 
al. highlights the significance of this turn; for structur- 
alism, like statism, emphasizes  the role of  constraint, 
rather than choice,  in political behavior. What makes 
the departure so striking, of course, is that they study 
politics in a so-called totalitarian society. Where others 
saw  only  binding  constraints,  political  activists  per- 
ceived  room  to  maneuver, the  authors find. Even  in 
totalitarian systems, they contend, there is good reason 
to view politics as decentralized  and manipulable. In 
the face of such findings-and  the evidence  provided 
by the  subsequent  collapse  of  the  East  German  re- 
gime-the  authors move  from  structuralist forms  of 
sociological theory to an ambivalent embrace of ration- 
al choice as a means for studying politics. 
The turn to rational choice also represents a reaction 
against functionalist  forms  of  analysis. Thus,  Cohen 
argues against dependency theory, capitalist logic, and 
the approach  of O'Donnell  (1979), each of which  views 
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authoritarianism as fulfilling a  role  necessary  to  the 
growth of  capitalism. Motivating Cohen's criticism is 
his  opposition  functionalist explanation, with its em- 
phasis on the social as the appropriate level of analysis. 
Authoritarianism  did  not  happen  in  Latin  America 
because the economic system required it, he argues; it 
was not socially rational. Rather, it resulted from the 
actions  of  those  unable  to  transcend  the  limits  of 
individual rationality. 
While  focusing  on  topical  issues,  the  works  thus 
suggest that the  movement  to  rational choice  theory 
represents  the  outcome  of  intellectual  debate.  The 
movement represents a search for deeper understand- 
ings  and  a  reaction  to  the  limitations  of  previous 
approaches. The authors address ethnicity, democrati- 
zation,  and the  fall  of  communism; but they remain 
centrally concerned with the merits and defects of core 
theoretical positions. The authors seek a decentralized 
approach, based  on  microfoundations,  in  which  the 
collective  outcome  is derived, albeit often perversely, 
from choices made by individuals. 
EVALUATION 
It is useful to group these works into two schools. One 
focuses on collective action and the other on collective 
choice. I would place in the first category the studies of 
ethnicity  and  revolution  and  Cohen's  study  of  the 
collapse of democracy. In the latter, I would place the 
work of Colomer, Cowhey and McCubbins, and Laver 
and Shepsle. 
The  two  schools  possess  different parentage.  The 
canonical text in the first remains Mancur Olson's The 
Logic of Collective  Action (1977); the central issue, that 
of the incentives to bear the costs of political action; 
and the central analytics, the prisoners' dilemma game. 
In this school, progress has largely taken the form of 
broadening  the  analytics  to  include  coordination 
games-something  long advocated by Hardin, but also 
supported by Kuran and by Karl-Dieter Opp et  al.- 
and  of  deepening  them  by  exploring  the  prisoners' 
dilemma in extended form. 
Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) 
stands  as  the  canonical  text  of  the  collective  choice 
tradition; the central issue is the relationship between 
individual preferences  and  collective  outcomes;  and 
the use  of  spatial models  provides its basic analytics. 
Progress in this field has taken a variety of forms, the 
most relevant for this essay being the  analysis of the 
effect of  institutions in generating equlibria in other- 
wise indeterminate political environments. 
Underlying each tradition are technical foundations. 
The concept of rationality in choice has been rigorously 
axiomatized, clarifying distinctions of  great relevance 
for  both  normative  and  positive  analysis  (see,  for 
example,  Sen  1982).  Collective  behavior,  either  in 
institution-free  (collective  action)  or  rule-governed 
(collective  choice)  environments, has been  studied by 
applying game theory. Beneath both decision and game 
theory lie theorems that establish what can and cannot 
in general be claimed. The rational  choice approach 
can be deployed  in a powerful  manner,  but it must be 
studied deeply before it can be employed effectively in 
the analysis of politics. 
Colomer's initial chapters, to  illustrate, cry out for 
theoretical  clarification. By  my  reading,  Colomer  is 
exploiting  the  tension  among  three  basic  axioms  in 
collective  choice  theory: the  independence  of  irrele- 
vant alternatives, universal admissibility, and transitiv- 
ity  in  collective  choice.  Had  Colomer  explicitly 
grounded  his  work  upon  axiomatic  foundations,  he 
could  have  communicated  those  tensions  with  far 
greater clarity. He  also could have advanced his argu- 
ments with far greater power. For he then could have 
argued that Arrow's theorem  (1951)  provides insight 
into  the  possibility  of  democracy  in  two  senses:  its 
ability to operate as a coherent form of government but 
also its ability to exist, that is, to arise in the first place. 
Cohen,  too,  could have cut deeper.  Realizing  that 
socially rational outcomes  are attainable in prisoners' 
dilemma  games  through (certain forms)  of  repeated 
play, Cohen makes a series of thoughtful arguments as 
to why political cooperation was not achieved in Latin 
American democracies. But he fails to explore the full 
implications of the  extended form. A  more thorough 
analysis would have led him to pay closer attention to 
the militant's threat. What benefits would have justified 
the costs the militants would have had to pay, should 
they undermine  the  electoral  prospects  of  their own 
political party? Put another way: Why would the mod- 
erates treat the militant's threats as credible? Recast- 
ing the  game in extended  form not  only would have 
highlighted the significance of such questions but also 
would have underscored the significance of the institu- 
tional  setting.  In  particular, it  would  have  focused 
attention  on  the  internal  structure  of  the  political 
parties; for it was the inability of the parties to defend 
and sustain their leaders' pledges that appears to have 
undermined  the  credibility of  interparty agreements. 
Moving from the analysis of single plays of the game to 
an analysis of strategic behavior over time thus would 
have exposed missing portions of Cohen's account and 
led him to an even deeper investigation of the collapse 
of democracy. 
A  last slap on  the wrist, or perhaps confession  of 
bias: On the basis of the evidence of these books, the 
literature on collective action needs, I feel, structure- 
indeed, much more structure. One way of making this 
point is by returning once again to the work of Cohen. 
As  intimated  above,  insofar as  Cohen's  argument is 
correct, it then implies an internal party structure that 
renders  party  leaders  unable  to  discipline  militant 
followers. From where might this inability derive? By 
the reasoning of Cox and Rosenbluth (in Cowhey and 
McCubbins), party leaders in presidential systems face 
higher costs in achieving party unity than do those in 
parliamentary  systems;  and  those  who  compete  in 
open-list  systems, which  enable  candidates  to  amass 
personal votes, confront higher costs than do those in 
closed-list  systems. And,  as shown by Geddes  in The 
Politician's Dilemma  (1994),  the  kinds of  preference 
orderings studied by Cohen can be transformed to ones 
favoring  cross-party  cooperation,  in certain competi- 
tive settings. 
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Phrased narrowly, Cohen's account could have ben- 
efited  from  a closer  analysis of  the  institutional and 
political  setting  of  his actors. Phrased more  broadly, 
the  turn  to  rational  choice  has  in  part  reflected  a 
resistance to structuralist accounts; but, clearly, the two 
are  complements,  not  substitutes,  in  the  analysis of 
politics.  It would  appear that  rational choice  theory 
can,  indeed,  provide  informative insights. But  it  ap- 
pears best able to provide the foundations for scientific 
inquiry when applied to highly structured settings. It is 
perhaps  for  this  reason  that  I  come  away from  my 
reading finding my thinking most shaped by the work of 
Cowhey and McCubbins and Laver and Shepsle. 
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